The value of fear and the limitations of expertise

A key question is whether it helps to be more afraid of nuclear weapons. Annie Jacobsen argues it does. She wrote her book to illustrate the horror of nuclear war, hoping to stimulate important conversations. When she was young, the threat of nuclear weapons felt more present and thinkable.

I wanted to demonstrate in appalling detail just how horrific nuclear war would be as a way perhaps for people to have precisely the kind of conversation that you and I are having.

However, Tyler questions if obsessing over nuclear war could inadvertently raise the risks by making it more psychologically salient. Annie disagrees, noting that what we worry about is not always what happens, citing the unexpected arrival of the global pandemic. She suggests the real issue is what we choose to focus on and what we deem important to think about.

The discussion then shifts to the role of expertise. Tyler points out that many experts in the post-World War II era, like Herman Kahn, seemed to get most things wrong, such as predicting an imminent nuclear war or favoring a first strike. He wonders if a more common-sense approach, like Ronald Reagan's, might be more effective. Annie responds by distinguishing between expertise and wisdom.

I think of wisdom more than I think of air quotes expertise. I've met a lot of experts in my day and I've met many people whose wisdom outperforms, again, just in my opinion, their expertise.

She clarifies that this doesn't mean dismissing experts entirely, but acknowledging that no one can predict the future. She positions her own work as focusing more on the perspectives of "ground operators" rather than purely theoretical thinkers.

The irrationality of nuclear war game theory

The discussion begins with a hypothetical question: in a six-minute window to decide on a nuclear launch, who should be advising the US President? Annie finds the premise itself to be the problem. She argues that no one should ever have to make such a monumental decision in just six minutes. She references Ronald Reagan, who himself called the idea an "irrational concept." The notion that one person could make a decision that would essentially end civilization is fundamentally flawed.

Tyler presses the point, acknowledging the flawed system but noting that it exists today. So, in the interim, who should be the advisor? Annie insists on shifting the focus away from this question. She believes the only real solution is to move toward disarmament, as this reduces the likelihood of that six-minute window ever arising.

This leads to a classic strategic paradox. Tyler questions whether disarmament might make the world more dangerous by eliminating a country's second-strike capability. Annie counters by framing the entire concept of nuclear deterrence as a form of insanity. To illustrate, she quotes Tyler's former professor, Thomas Schelling, from a 1986 radio interview.

The problem with applying game theory to nuclear war is that nuclear war by its very nature does not involve rational men. It can't. What sane person would be willing to kill hundreds of millions of people, ruin the earth and end modern civilization in order to make somebody called the enemy doesn't win first.

Tyler suggests this quote might be an example of Schelling's dark sense of humor, arguing that while nuclear war is insane, it might be the best of the available insane options. Annie disagrees. She interprets the quote as a genuine reflection from Schelling in his later years. She has observed a similar pattern in her career interviewing elderly defense officials. Many come to see things differently in the third act of their lives, recognizing that intellectualizing nuclear war, as one might with game theory, is its own form of madness.

The calculus of retaliation and the madness of deterrence

If Russia or China were to launch a full-scale nuclear attack on the United States by mistake, what is the probability of a retaliatory launch? Annie believes the probability is certain, based on her interviews with individuals who held the power to execute such an order. Tyler is less sure, placing the odds of retaliation at 60% or 70%. He suggests that in the heat of the moment, a president might hesitate.

This leads to a discussion about the concept of "madness." Tyler finds the term unconvincing, noting that many social conventions could be seen as a form of madness. The real goal, he argues, is to find the "least harmful form of madness." In his view, if enough people believe nuclear war is madness, it actually strengthens the principle of deterrence. Annie disagrees, pointing to a high-ranking official at STRATCOM who warned that if deterrence fails, "it all unravels."

It's madness because it ends civilization. For what? For why?

The true madness, Annie suggests, is the complete unraveling of civilization for no reason. Tyler counters that the alternative to nuclear weapons is not peace, but other terrifying options like biological, chemical, or AI-driven weapons. He wonders if we are stuck with the logic of mutual deterrence, and if nuclear weapons are the safest option simply because we have over 75 years of experience managing them.

Should we trade that all in for mutual assured destruction with biological weapons? I don't see the case for doing that.

Annie acknowledges this is a scary point. However, she notes that this long history of deterrence between superpowers like the U.S. and Russia has likely lessened the chance of a deliberate, full-scale exchange, as leaders are well-schooled in its logic.

The slim chance of intercepting a nuclear missile

The danger of nuclear war lies with newcomers to the field, like North Korea, who lack decades of precedent and are not ruled by conservative committees. This creates a scenario with a formidable, rogue-like nuclear power. Annie notes that even US presidents are often not deeply knowledgeable about nuclear weapons, assuming deterrence will hold. This makes decision-making in a crisis particularly fraught, especially when dealing with a leader who may not heed advice.

Considering a hypothetical North Korean missile launched at Washington D.C., the chance of interception is extremely low. While North Korea does possess missiles that can reach the US East Coast, the US missile defense system is not reliable. Annie states that the official success rate of about 50% comes from highly curated tests. In a real-world scenario, she believes the system would fail. Former NORAD commanders have not disputed this assessment.

The warhead coming in is traveling at about 14,000 miles an hour, 500 to 700 miles above the Earth. And the interceptor is trying to shoot it down with essentially like a giant bowling ball at 20,000 miles an hour, 500 to 700 miles above the Earth. So the technology involved is exquisite. And it fails time and time again.

Comparisons to Israel's Iron Dome are misleading. The Iron Dome is effective against short and medium-range missiles, but it cannot shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) traveling at immense speeds and altitudes. This distinction is crucial, as Nobel laureate Charles Townes, inventor of the laser, also confirmed that an Iron Dome-style system for ICBMs was not feasible. While future, classified space-based technologies might change this, current systems are inadequate.

Faced with this grim reality, Tyler questions why the US doesn't invest heavily, perhaps 5% of GDP, in developing a robust defense system, similar to the scale of the Manhattan Project, if the threat is so existential.

How a TV movie influenced Reagan's nuclear policy

The only viable solution to the threat of nuclear weapons is communication and disarmament, not increased defense spending. Annie tells a story about Ronald Reagan, who began his presidency as a nuclear hawk. His perspective shifted dramatically after he watched the TV movie The Day After. He wrote in his journal that the film left him feeling "greatly depressed."

This emotional response led Reagan to reach out to Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR. Their collaboration resulted in the Reykjavik Summit and a massive reduction in the world's nuclear arsenal, from 70,000 warheads in 1986 to about 12,300 today. Tyler notes that Reagan first pursued a strategy of strength, building up arms and calling the Soviet Union an "evil empire" before engaging in diplomacy.

Reagan realized that he could no longer treat the nuclear armed Russia as the enemy that you want to kill. Enemies you kill in Defense Department. They had to be an adversary. He had to work with them. And that is the only mental pathway, theoretical pathway I can see as a viable solution to this madness.

Annie emphasizes that misinformation about nuclear weapons is common, pointing out that even Reagan once incorrectly stated in a press conference that submarine-launched ballistic missiles could be recalled. When considering a hypothetical nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, she highlights that even a limited conflict could have global consequences. The soot from a 200-weapon exchange would loft into the atmosphere and block the sun, affecting the entire planet. This, she argues, is why other major powers like the US and China would be compelled to intervene and de-escalate the situation.

The 72-minute nuclear war and the threat of domestic drone attacks

Annie clarifies that her book does not delve into geopolitical scenarios like a rebellious general launching a few nukes. Instead, her work focuses on a full-scale nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States. She bases this on a conversation with a former commander of StratCom, General Keillor, who explained the catastrophic speed of such an event.

Annie, the world could end in the next couple of hours.

The entire sequence, from nuclear launch to nuclear winter, would happen in just 72 minutes. When Tyler asks about other scenarios, Annie maintains that her focus is strictly on this rapid escalation and not on the lead-up or limited exchanges that other authors have explored.

The conversation then shifts to domestic security threats. Tyler asks why there have not yet been any significant drone attacks in the United States. Annie expresses her surprise that such an event has not occurred. She is particularly concerned about the potential for mimicry in such a situation. If one attack happened, it could inspire a wave of copycat incidents, which she describes as "shocking and dangerous and terrifying."

A deathbed call from a CIA insider fuels speculation

When asked how many conspiracy theories she believes in, Annie Jacobsen explains that she finds the term itself to be somewhat accusatory. Instead, she reports on actual stories based on interviews with high-ranking officials about events people often label as conspiracies, such as those surrounding Area 51 or Operation Paperclip. Tyler shares his own short list of beliefs, including the idea that the COVID vaccine was delayed for political reasons and that there is more cheating in sports betting than is commonly acknowledged.

Regarding the Kennedy assassination, Annie recounts a story about Dr. Bud Wheelon, the first director of the CIA's Department of Science and Technology. Wheelon was one of five CIA directors taken into a basement by Allen Dulles right after JFK was killed; they emerged hours later looking pale and shocked. When Annie interviewed Wheelon for her book, she was explicitly forbidden from asking about JFK. After their interviews concluded, Wheelon told her they would never speak again once her book was published. However, a year later, she received a missed call from him just days before he died. When she called back, he was unable to speak.

I think it speaks to why these hidden mysteries are interpreted as conspiracies. Because people know things that for whatever reason, they cannot say. And my takeaway was that Dr. Wieland was going to tell me something. That's why he called me on his deathbed.

Annie believes this experience illustrates how secrets and hidden information naturally lead to speculation and what many call conspiracy theories.

The dark truth behind UAPs and Area 51

Annie Jacobsen's view on UAPs, formerly known as UFOs, is that they are not extraterrestrial. She has interviewed most of the key figures in this area and has found no evidence of alien visitation.

I have no reason to believe that off planet extraterrestrial beings or intelligence have come to the United States or anywhere on Earth.

Instead, her research for the book Area 51 pointed to a much darker and deeply controversial explanation. She believes the phenomena are linked to a "terrible human experiment program."

When questioned why the topic is so dark if there are no alien bodies or craft, Annie explains that one of her primary sources, a well-known figure in that world, confessed that he was involved in this human experiment program. This source maintained his story until he died.

Redefining conspiracy theories as a matter of belief and desire

People may be overly inclined to believe in conspiracy theories because it is easier to imagine disliked groups plotting against us than to accept that events are just a series of accidents. This tendency is a form of anthropomorphizing, similar to how ancient people attributed weather to gods.

Annie disagrees with the term "conspiracy theory." For her, a conspiracy is a legal concept involving two or more people plotting something. She believes what is often labeled as conspiracy theorizing is better understood as a matter of beliefs, which can be tied to desire. She suggests that more poetic or descriptive language, such as "crazy beliefs," might be more appropriate.

The Pentagon's system versus the CIA's individualism

There are significant differences in the operational mindsets of various US government agencies. The Pentagon, for instance, operates with a fascinating focus on order and systematic control. In contrast, the Central Intelligence Agency seems to prioritize individual action, particularly among its field operators. These two approaches are almost diametrically opposed. One relies on following the system, while the other is about individual courses of action.

Annie suggests that both approaches are necessary, drawing a parallel to personal life. An individual needs both order and discipline, like a system, but also the freedom for individual decision-making. In this way, the military and intelligence communities work hand in glove. Tyler offers his own view, considering the Pentagon one of the worst-run parts of government, while viewing the "deep state," or intelligence community, as relatively well-run due to the high intelligence and analytical power of its members and consultants.

A common misconception is that the US government is a single, monolithic entity, which is far from the truth. When interviewing individuals from these secretive communities, whom some might label as part of the "deep state," Annie stresses the importance of approaching them with an open mind. She explains her method is to be agnostic and avoid prejudging people based on what she has read or heard. She believes this is crucial for earnest reporting.

I try to be agnostic, going into interviews, as I would wish one would be with me. Meaning not. Because if you're gonna prejudge someone based on what you read, that is pro or heard on a podcast, that is dangerous.

What people in the intelligence community are really like

When asked about the people she has met from the intelligence community, Annie Jacobsen's main conclusion is that they are surprisingly relatable. While she initially hesitates to put people in a box, her experience has shown her that beneath the surface, there are more similarities than differences.

We are all so much more alike than we are different.

Tyler agrees, adding that he finds them more analytical on average. Annie builds on this, describing them as clever and constantly operating on multiple frequencies. She shares an anecdote about Billy Waugh, the main character from her book on the CIA's paramilitary unit. She traveled with him to Vietnam when he was 87 and was astonished by his constant state of high alert.

How does an 87 year old, how is he firing on so many circuits all at once? But he was, because he was trained that way and he was always used to having someone on his tail trying to kill him.

After her book was published, she and Billy became friends, and he shared personal things that reinforced her view. This hyper-awareness is a result of their training and the dangerous environments they operated in.

ESP's fleeting nature makes it unscientific

Annie found Uri Geller fascinating, noting a significant difference between his private self and his public persona. She spent time with him at his home near London and in Israel. Annie observes that many public figures, including Geller, work to uphold a carefully constructed image of themselves.

When asked why extrasensory perception (ESP) isn't easily demonstrable in a laboratory, Annie explains that it is a fleeting phenomenon rooted in belief rather than science. While she witnessed events that were inexplicable by logic or science, their lack of repeatability is key.

I saw things that were inexplicable. You couldn't really explain them by logic or science, but you can't repeat that behavior. And so it's not science.

Because these experiences cannot be reliably replicated, she concludes that ESP cannot be practically "used." This was a hard-learned lesson for organizations like the CIA and the Department of Defense, which mistakenly believed it could be weaponized or otherwise utilized.

The Red Rambler theory as an explanation for ESP

It is uncertain whether government bodies still use psychics, but Annie suspects these programs may continue. This practice is sometimes seen with local law enforcement, which reflects a broader public belief in psychic abilities. This belief could stem from a desire for a guiding force in the universe.

Wouldn't it be amazing if there was a magical force that was guiding us? I think that's why people believe in psychic functioning.

A related concept, the placebo effect, was originated by a CIA doctor named Henry Beecher. When asked about extrasensory perception (ESP), Annie recalls personal experiences where someone told her something that later came true. However, she is non-committal about whether it was genuinely ESP. Tyler attributes such events to coincidence.

Annie offers an alternative explanation called the "Red Rambler theory." This theory suggests that once an idea enters your consciousness, you become more likely to notice it in your environment. Tyler identifies this phenomenon as confirmation bias, which Annie finds more plausible than ESP.

Now that I've said the Red Rambler theory, you will end up seeing a red Rambler... once something is in your consciousness, the chances of you seeing it are much greater.

How literature subconsciously shapes a writer's work

Annie Jacobsen is an avid reader. During a recent interview, someone suggested that her book, Nuclear War, A Scenario, was influenced by John Hersey's Hiroshima and Cormac McCarthy's The Road. Annie confirmed this, noting that she has read both of those books more than once.

I'm the kind of author and reporter that just reads, reads, reads, reads, reads. And then things quibble up in your subconscious and become manifest.

Annie Jacobsen on her career origins and favorite media

Annie Jacobsen attributes her career path of writing about war, weapons, and national security to "fate and circumstance" rather than her family background or formal training. She began covering these topics as a young reporter and found them deeply compelling.

These subjects are absolutely life and death, dramatic, and they make me feel like I want to keep writing.

When asked for her favorites, Annie names Moby Dick or Bleakhouse as her top novel and Gladiator as her favorite film. For the best movie about nuclear war, she looks forward to Denis Villeneuve's forthcoming Nuclear War: A Scenario. She also recommends a lesser-known film from the late 1980s called Miracle Mile, which is about a couple in Los Angeles who fall in love during an impending nuclear holocaust.