Edgar Snow's 1937 book, Red Star Over China, established a romanticized narrative of the Chinese Communist Party that persists today. Based on interviews with Mao Zedong, the book portrays the Communists as a heroic force fighting for freedom against oppressive feudalism and capitalism. Frank describes the work as a fantastic showpiece where the Communists told their story exactly how they wanted it projected to the world. Snow acted as a mouthpiece, leaving their claims utterly unchallenged.

It is a David and Goliath story. It is the Communists who are fighting for freedom in the hills against the oppressive forces of feudalism, capitalism, fascism. Mao Zedong is the one who will liberate the great masses.

This narrative turned Mao into a household name and provided a foundation for the party's own official history. Frank argues that the book effectively became the official party line. Even today, the Communist Party maintains this core story. They might fine-tune certain details or make people disappear from photographs, but the overall message of liberation and emancipation remains the same.

Historians of modern China have long relied on limited information. After 1949, the country was locked up for three decades. No researchers could access libraries or archives. This forced scholars to use sources published by the Communist Party. Much of what people know comes from books like Red Star Over China by Edgar Snow, which Frank describes as a fairy tale. In the 1980s, the party commissioned a massive project to collect every piece of paper produced by local branches between 1923 and 1949. These 300 volumes were meant to be internal documents for high-ranking members only.

These books were not meant to be publicly available. But of course, they found their way across the border into Hong Kong. So it was simple. I found it in Hong Kong. It was as simple as that.

Frank also emphasizes the importance of Russian archives. The Comintern was established in 1919 and maintained heavy contact with the Chinese Communist Party. Without these Russian documents, it is impossible to understand China's modern history. The records show that Joseph Stalin set the parameters for the party rather than Chairman Mao. Stalin appears on many pages of the new research because his influence was foundational. Most historians have missed this because they do not use these extensive archives or read the Russian sources.

You cannot understand the rise of the Communist China from '21 to '49 if you do not have access to the material that circulated between the Comintern and the Communist Party of China in Russian. It is Stalin who sets the parameters. It is not Chairman Mao.

The common historical narrative suggests the party rose to power by championing peasants against corrupt warlords and the rich. This story usually starts with the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912 and leads to the Long March in the 1930s. In this version, the communists gained support while the nationalists were viewed as fascists supported by the West. Frank uses his access to primary evidence to question this triumphal version of the past that has remained largely untouched by Western critical analysis.

The Chinese Communist Party did not begin as a local movement led by Mao. It was established in 1921 by the Comintern, the Soviet organization dedicated to overthrowing the international bourgeoisie. Soviet agents arrived in 1919 and cultivated a tiny group of followers. For its first few years, the party remained an irrelevant organization with only a few dozen members.

The turning point came in 1923 through a strategic alliance with the Nationalists. Frank explains that the Nationalists, led by Sun Yat-sen, were determined to unify China through violence and desperately needed support. Moscow used this as a Trojan horse. They agreed to provide weapons and funding only if the Nationalists allowed members of the Communist Party into their ranks.

We can give you weapons, support, money if you accept members of the Chinese Communist Party inside the ranks of the Nationalist Party.

This United Front was engineered by Bolshevik agents, including the Dutch envoy Henk Sneevliet. Without this Soviet intervention, the party likely would not have survived. From 1925 onward, Stalin and his representatives controlled the party's strategy. Their support was so critical that they repeatedly saved Mao and his fighters from being wiped out by the Nationalists.

Without these Bolshevik agents, including Henk Sneevliet and many others, there would never have been anything.

The Nationalist army, once influenced by Russian advisor Mikhail Borodin, sought to unify China through the Northern Expedition in 1926. While they succeeded in the south by 1927, internal friction grew. Communist members incited mobs against landowners and foreigners to disrupt the project. This tension peaked in March 1927 when Communist forces killed several foreigners in Nanjing. This incident forced a permanent break between the two groups.

Chiang Kai-shek realizes that the Communists are basically destroying that project of his, which is to unite the country. So on the 24th of March, Communist forces massacre a number of foreigners in Nanjing, burn buildings, create an incident which is hardly mentioned in the history books, which prompts Chiang Kai-shek to think we should get rid of those Communists.

Chiang Kai-shek was never a Communist. Frank explains that Chiang recognized early on that the Soviet Union wanted to use his party for its own ends. He aimed for a stable and independent nation free from foreign oppression. While he wanted to abolish the system of foreign concessions, he did not want to return to an imperial system or impose Western capitalism. Instead, he sought a path that remained in touch with traditional Chinese values.

His approach to unification relied heavily on military power. Frank notes that this was a strategic mistake. As the army moved forward, Communist cells stayed behind to incite mobs and create chaos. This created a cycle of violence and instability that plagued his efforts to build a wealthy nation.

What he wants is what most people want, a reasonably stable, wealthy, independent nation. That is what he tries to achieve. Unfortunately, the means is through an army, so it is unification imposed at the barrel of a gun from above, and that is a mistake because once you start with his northern expedition, in its trail, there are all sorts of Communist cells that continue to incite mobs in his rear.

The Long March is often portrayed as a heroic feat, but it was actually a long retreat and an absolute disaster. Mao Zedong left with forces numbering 80,000 and arrived in the north of China a year later with only 6,000. This massive reduction was the result of death and desertion. During this period, the communists survived largely through plunder. They would seize small county towns, execute local power holders, and recruit soldiers at the barrel of a gun. They also relied on the Soviet Union for weapons and support.

The Long March really is a long retreat and an absolute disaster in that he leaves with forces that count in the 80,000 and arrives at a mere 6,000 a year later in the north of China.

By 1936, the Communist Party of China had only about 40,000 members in a population of half a billion. There is a common misconception that there was an equivalence between the Communists and the Nationalists during the 1920s and 30s. In reality, the party represented a mere fraction of the population. Frank points out that even in countries where the party was banned or under a dictatorship, like Finland or Portugal, the proportion of communists was higher than in China. In 1940, the proportion of communists in China was roughly the same as in the United States, which was not exactly a vanguard of world revolution.

Despite this weak position and humiliating retreat, figures like Edgar Snow portrayed the movement as heroic. Snow interviewed Mao at the very moment his forces had been decimated. This created a narrative that masked the fact that the party was a tiny, struggling group in a massive country.

By the early 1930s, the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek had already begun dismantling the system of foreign concessions and unequal treaties. Much of the treaty port system had been abolished or scheduled for return to the central government by 1933. This progress suggests that the Communists had very little popular appeal at the time. Their survival was largely due to intervention from Stalin, who insisted in 1936 that the Communists join a United Front with the Nationalists to focus on the Japanese threat.

When the Japanese launched a ferocious invasion in 1937, the Nationalist government bore the full brunt of the military force. This conflict involved mass bombings, the use of chemical weapons on civilians, and the systematic violence in Nanjing. While the Nationalists fought these massive battles, the Communists remained in the hinterland and largely avoided direct engagement with the Japanese.

The Japanese Army would do what the Communists were not in a position to accomplish, namely attack, destroy, or displace government troops, the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists, from all the major cities along the coast. The Communists remained safely ensconced in the hinterland.

The Communists even received up to 90 percent of their funding from the Nationalist government during this period. Instead of using these resources to fight the invasion, they waited for the Japanese to displace the Nationalists. They then moved into the vacuum left behind. Their primary objective remained the displacement of the Nationalists rather than the defeat of the Japanese. Frank explains that they used the invasion as an opportunity to reoccupy parts of the country while their rivals were occupied with the war.

The victory of the Communists in 1949 was not a result of popular support. During the civil war, millions of refugees fled toward the Nationalist-controlled areas to escape the Communists. No one ever witnessed people fleeing toward Communist-controlled territory. Instead, the Communists used a strategy of attrition. They showed a greater determination to wage a war of fire, famine, and sword. This mirrored the approach of the Bolsheviks in Russia, who won because they were more willing to use extreme violence than their opponents.

The Soviets don't just disappear, they stay there until May 1946 and they help the Communists turn their ragtag army of guerrilla fighters into a formidable fighting machine. 16 military academies are established. Some of the soldiers are sent to Moscow for advanced training. Trainloads of material come from both North Korea and Siberia.

A major turning point occurred at the end of the Second World War. The Soviet Red Army invaded Manchuria in August 1945. This region was massive and wealthy in natural resources. It served as the strategic gateway to the rest of China. Frank notes that while the Americans originally requested Soviet help against Japan because they did not anticipate the effectiveness of the atom bomb, Stalin used the opportunity to seize territory and empower Mao.

The Soviets eventually turned over Manchuria to the Chinese Communists. This gave them the base they needed to breach the Great Wall and conquer the rest of the country. They transformed a weak guerrilla force into a professional army with advanced training and massive shipments of weapons from Siberia and North Korea. In essence, it was the Red Army that paved the way for the conquest of China.

The story of American involvement in China after the Second World War began with a series of significant diplomatic miscalculations. In 1943, Vice President Henry Wallace visited the Soviet Union and China. He was impressed by the Soviet model and urged Chiang Kai-shek to adopt similar methods. A pervasive myth at the time, fueled by Stalin, suggested that Chinese Communists were not real communists. Instead, they were dismissed as margarine communists or simple agrarian reformers. This misunderstanding led American leadership to insist that Chiang Kai-shek form a coalition government with the Communist forces.

The story with the Americans starts in '43 when Roosevelt sends his vice president called Henry Wallace. He visits what you and I would call the Gulag, is deeply impressed, arrives in Chongqing, speaks to Chiang Kai-shek, and says, "You really should do what the Soviets are doing in Siberia. It's a great economic model."

In late 1945, President Truman sent George Marshall to China to enforce a coalition. Marshall's intervention had devastating consequences for the Nationalist government. In January 1946, Marshall imposed a truce. The Communists violated this agreement the very day it was signed. Later, when the Nationalists were on the verge of a decisive victory in Manchuria, Marshall intervened again to stop their advance. Frank explains that Marshall's actions effectively saved the Communist forces from being pushed out of China and into Siberia.

The Nationalist Central Government managed to defeat the Communists to the point where they would have been repulsed out of China into Siberia. Had it not been for one man who insisted yet again on a truce. And that is, of course, George Marshall.

To make matters worse, Marshall imposed an arms embargo on the Nationalists in September 1946. This lasted for about a year while the Soviets were actively arming the Communists. The Nationalists were forced to rebuild a war-torn country while fighting an enemy focused entirely on sabotage. When aides warned Marshall that the Communists were repeatedly breaking their promises, Marshall dismissed the concerns. He remained convinced they were not real communists, clinging to the idea of them as agrarian reformers.

The question of who lost China often points to communist infiltration within the American government. Peter suggests that while spies existed, the bigger issue was a story of total American naivety. Frank agrees and notes that the British had a different perspective due to their imperial history. They were better at recognizing dangerous leaders and understood that forcing two armed, unwilling parties into a coalition is impossible. This was proven during the collapse of the Greek coalition in 1944 which led to a brutal civil war. The same pattern repeated in China.

You cannot force two parties who are armed and unwilling to collaborate to enter a coalition. And look at what happened in Greece. The moment the Brits take Athens, this coalition collapses and it is followed by a brutal civil war. And the same thing happens in China.

Timing was a critical factor in how the United States handled the spread of communism. Truman eventually recognized the threat in Europe and acted decisively with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. He even stood firm on staying in Berlin when his advisors claimed it was indefensible. However, he did not show the same resolve in China. Truman viewed helping the Republic of China as a waste of resources. He famously remarked that providing further aid would be like pouring sand down a rat hole.

By 1947, the Communists were using tactics that were nearly impossible to defeat. They utilized human waves and sent unarmed villagers to absorb bullets. A particularly dark example was the siege of Changchun in Manchuria. General Lin Biao ordered the city to be starved into surrender. Approximately 160,000 civilians died of hunger during the blockade. When leaders in other cities like Beijing saw the resulting flood of starving refugees, they often chose to cut deals with the Communists rather than suffer a similar fate.

Let Changchun starve into surrender. 160,000 ordinary civilians are trapped and die of hunger. Now you can see what happens. If you are the mayor of Beijing and you see this flood of refugees, you say to yourself, "Let's cut a deal."

Communism was never popular in China. It was imposed on the population at the barrel of a gun. Today, China presents a facade of stability and wealth, but this image hides a deeper reality. Frank points out that while the state projects success, some 600 million Chinese people still live on less than 140 dollars a month. The current regime uses propaganda to show off achievements, much like they did in the 1940s when they showed model schools and prisons to visiting Americans.

The past will always come back and bite you. It will. Yes, absolutely. I mean, it's all nice and well to believe some of that facade of stability and wealth in the People's Republic of China. But some 600 million Chinese live on less than $140 a month. There's great poverty there.

China operates under a state of enforced amnesia. By burying its monstrous past, the country is trapped in a cycle where it repeats the same mistakes. This lack of honesty about history creates a systemic weakness. Frank argues that a country cannot produce genuinely great universities if academics are not free to tell the truth about their own history. While Chinese universities might rise in global rankings, these statistics are often mocked by people inside the country. True pursuit of knowledge cannot exist where books like 1984 are banned and people cannot speak freely.

A one-party state can succeed in specific areas by pouring massive resources into them. If the regime decides to excel at making electric cars or high-speed trains, it can achieve those goals. However, this is different from organic innovation. The Chinese system does not allow for the kind of constant innovation that comes from unexpected places or small garages.

If a regime decides that it must excel at making electric cars, it will succeed. But it is not a system which allows for constant innovation coming from all sorts of very unexpected corners, including your proverbial garage.

Taiwan's history is a progression from a tough dictatorship under Chiang Kai-shek to a genuine operating democracy. After the Nationalists withdrew to the island in 1949, the regime was very rough on the native population. However, Taiwan eventually transitioned into a society with economic freedom, a vigorous press, and hotly contested elections. Today, it is also the global hub for high-value semiconductor production.

The strategic importance of Taiwan has shifted in American policy. While previous documents focused on regional stability, recent national security strategies suggest that Chinese control over Taiwan would represent a direct threat to United States interests. This is partly due to the island's role in global shipping and its position within the island chains. Frank views the defense of the island as a critical priority that requires significant military support.

A good move today with Taiwan would be to arm it to the teeth. Taiwan is essential, absolutely essential.

Xi Jinping's recent purge of the Chinese military high command has seen the removal of almost every top general. This includes individuals who were once considered close confidants. While some media reports frame these moves as an attempt to eliminate graft and corruption, Frank argues this is a misinterpretation of how communist systems function. In a one-party state without a free press or opposition, corruption is systemic and affects nearly every official. Since it is impossible to remove every person, the charge of corruption becomes a tool to eliminate real or perceived political enemies.

In a one-party state without a free press, you do not know who is corrupt, and in effect it means that every party member is corrupt, so you cannot purge all of them. So the point is that you use this corruption to purge those you think might potentially be an enemy.

This pattern of purging dates back to the early days of Chairman Mao. The goal is to keep everyone on their toes and ensure absolute loyalty. After 14 years in power, the fact that Xi has been unable to put in place a military team he can trust reveals a deep flaw in the system. However, this internal instability does not mean the world should be less concerned about a potential conflict over Taiwan. Frank warns that the regime remains absolutely relentless in its goals.

It is better to eliminate 100 people who are innocent than to let one enemy fly under the radar.

Frank Dikötter chose to study China in 1985 because he wanted to see the most remote place on earth. Having studied both Russian and Chinese, he realized that understanding Chinese history requires knowledge of the Soviet system. Many Western scholars were proficient in the Chinese language but failed to recognize the deep connections between the two communist regimes.

Xi Jinping is trapped in a systemic worldview that is fundamentally paranoid. He and other leaders are convinced that the capitalist world is a wicked, imperialist force determined to destroy the Communist Party. This mindset creates an environment of total distrust. Xi does not trust his own military committees. He even requires people to pass through metal detectors before meeting him. This culture of suspicion means that no one in the leadership can speak openly to one another.

These people are barely aware of any of the massive differences that exist between Communist systems and the rest of the world. They barely traveled. This is a system where you must constantly watch your back, constantly keep up tabs.

American policy should focus on three main strategies: containment, reciprocity, and strength. Since the Chinese leadership is already moving toward isolation, the US should effectively lock them in. Reciprocity involves a tit-for-tat approach to issues like journalists and trade. Finally, the US must stand up to bullying. The Chinese military and economy are not as strong as they appear. Leaders should call out these weaknesses directly.

When handling the hundreds of thousands of Chinese students in America, it is important to avoid becoming like the enemy. Closing off society or treating every student as a spy would be a mistake. Many of the brightest students from the PRC provide the best insights into the system they left behind. Policy should focus on specific individuals rather than broad bans.